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INTRODUCTION

Two international Tribunals recently examined what level of
direction and control has to be wielded by a State over military or
paramilitary groups to make a non-international conflict an international
one. The general view perceives the holdings of both tribunals to be in
conflict, this article maintains that they are not. It argues that both
tribunals were weighing factors, and that every court of first instance
always has to weigh these factors to decide whether acts of armed
groups can be attributed to a State.
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RELATION BETWEEN THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT AND THE
PROBLEM OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY

The question whether the conflict is international or not, is closely
related to the problem of State responsibility, and the question whether
acts of military or paramilitary groups who oppose the government of
State A are attributable to State B. 1
If the acts of the military or paramilitary group are attributable to
State B, for instance, because State B trained, financed and supervised
the military or paramilitary groups, then on the one hand State B will be
responsible under general international law for their acts. However, on
the other hand, the conflict in State A will be considered international
under the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols because
foreign State B has intervened in, at the first sight, a non-international
conflict in State A.
II.

FACTS OF THE NICARAGUA AND THE TADIC CASES

Two Tribunals have developed a test to determine the international
character of conflicts and the responsibility of an intervening State in
cases of military or paramilitary groups.
First, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) had to decide a case
of pure State responsibility.
In 1984, the Republic of Nicaragua charged the United States with
violations of customary and treaty law by its involvement in military
and paramilitary activities against Nicaragua. Nicaragua accused the
United States of attacks on oil pipelines, storage and port facilities, as
well as Nicaraguan naval patrol boats. Further complaints pertained to
the mining of Nicaraguan ports, violations of Nicaraguan air space, and
the training, arming, equipping, financing and supplying of counterrevolutionary forces (known as contras) seeking to overthrow the
government of Nicaragua.2 Nicaragua also claimed that the United
States was responsible for violations of international humanitarian law

1. Contra Commentary on the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
International Wrongful Acts, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its
Fifty-Third Session, 53 U.N. GAOR Supp. 10, U.N. Doc. N56/10 (2001), pp. 106-07, art. 8,
Comm.
5,
available
at
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/State_responsibility/responsibility_commentaries(e).pdf#pa
gemode=bookmarks (last visited Feb. 10, 2005). The commentaries explain that the two
legal issues can be different and that "[t]he [ICTY]'s mandate is directed to issues of
individual criminal responsibility, not State responsibility, and the question in [the Tadic]
case concerned not responsibility but the applicable rules of international humanitarian
law." Id.
2. LORI FISLERDAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 955 (2001).
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committed by the contras.
To decide whether the United States was responsible, the ICJ had
to decide whether the acts of (1) individual mercenaries hired by the
CIA and of (2) the contras were attributable to the United States.
Second, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) faced the same problem from a slightly different
perspective. 3
The ICTY was established in 1993 4 to prosecute persons
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law
committed in the territory of the Former Yugoslavia. 5
The ICTY has jurisdiction (or "competence") under its Statute to
prosecute persons who committed or who ordered to be committed
grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions,6 who violated the laws
or customs of war,7 who committed genocide, 8 or who committed
crimes against humanity. 9
The ICTY held that the international or non-international character
of the armed conflict is not relevant for its jurisdiction over violations of
the laws or customs of war under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute. 10
Neither is the character of the armed conflict relevant for the

3. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th Mtg., art. 5,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/827, 32 l.L.M. 1192 (1993), amended by S.C. Res. 1166 of May 13, 1998;
S.C. Res. 1329 ofNov. 30, 2000; S.C. Res. 1411 of Mai 17, 2002, S.C. Res. 1431Aug.13,
2002; S.C. Res. 1481 May 19, 2003, U.N. SCOR, 4759 meeting, S/RES/1481, available at
http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/statute.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2005) [hereinafter ICTY
Statute].
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at art. 2.
7. Id. at art. 3.
8. ICTY Statute, 32 1.L.M. 1192, at art. 4.
9. Id. at art. 5.
10. The Tadic Jurisdiction Appeals Chamber held that Article 3 of the ICTY Statute
applies to both international and non-international armed conflicts. Prosecutor v. Tadic,
Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, Appeals Judgment, at para. 137 (Oct. 2, 1995) [hereinafter Tadic Appeals
Judgment]; Prosecutor v. FurundZija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Judgment, para. 132
(Dec. 10, 1998); Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Trial Judgment, para. 161
(Mar. 3, 2000); Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T&IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Judgment
para. 402 (Feb. 22, 2001); Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Trial Judgment,
para. 163 (Feb. 26, 2001); Prosecutor v. Kvo~ka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Trial Judgment,
para. 123, (Nov. 2, 2001); Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, Trial Judgment,
para. 51 (Mar. 15, 2002).
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prosecution of persons who committed genocide 11 or crimes against
humanity. 12 However, the ICTY held that the character of the armed
conflict is relevant for the jurisdiction of the ICTY over grave breaches
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 13
Dusko Tadic was the first accused who appeared before the ICTY.
He was a supporter of the Greater Serbia nationalist cause. During the
armed conflict in 1992 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serb forces unlawfully
confined thousands of Muslims and Croats in the Omarska, Keraterm
and Tmopolje prison-camps. Tadic participated in the attack, seizure,
murder and maltreatment of Muslims and Croats both within the three
camps and outside the camps. He was indicted by the Prosecutor of the
ICTY and charged with grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, 14

11. ICTY Statute, 32 l.L.M. 1192, at art. 4 (Article 4 of the ICTY Statute does not
require that the genocide take place during an international armed conflict).
12. Id. at art. 5 (Article 5 of the ICTY Statute reads that crimes against humanity are
within the jurisdiction of the ICTY "when committed in armed conflict, whether
international or internal in character.")
13. The argument of the ICTY is that the 1949 Geneva Conventions establishes a
twofold "grave breaches" system: there is on the one hand an enumeration of offences that
are regarded so serious as to constitute "grave breaches," and closely bound up with this
enumeration a mandatory enforcement mechanism was set up, based on the concept of a
duty and a right of all Contracting States to search for and try or extradite persons allegedly
responsible for "grave breaches." The ICTY held that the universal jurisdiction is however
limited to the grave breaches committed in "international" armed conflicts. Tadic
Jurisdiction Appeals Judgment (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal
on Jurisdiction), IT-94-1-AR72, October 2, 1995, para. 79. This "international" armed
conflict requirement was a necessary limitation in 1949 on the grave breaches system in
light of the intrusion on State sovereignty that such mandatory universal jurisdiction
represents. The ICTY argued that State parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions did not
want to give other States jurisdiction over serious violations of international humanitarian
law committed in their domestic armed conflicts-at least not the mandatory universal
jurisdiction involved in the "grave breaches" system. Id. at para. 80. Thus, to have
jurisdiction under article 2 of its Statute, the ICTY had to find that the conflict in the Former
Yugoslavia was international. When the 1949 Geneva Conventions were updated with the
two Additional Protocols in 1977, the drafters quite explicitly excluded any suggestion that
there could be "grave breaches" during a non-international armed conflict. WILLIAM A.
SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 42 (Cambridge
University Press, 2001 ). However, Judge Abi-Saab stated in his Separate Opinion in the
Tadic Jurisdiction Appeals case that "a strong case can be made for the application of
Article 2, even when the incriminated act takes place in an internal conflict." (Separate
Opinion of Judge Abi-Saab, Tadic, IT-94-1-AR72, Jurisdiction Appeals Judgment, at para. 5
(Oct. 2, 1995)); see also CelebiCi, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Judgment, at para. 202 (Nov.
16, 1998); and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Rodrigues, Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T,
Trial Judgment, at para. 44 (June 25, 1999). Christine Byron, Armed Conflicts: International
or Non-International, 6 J. OF CONFLICT AND SEC. LAW 63, 66, n. 18 (2001); see also ICTY
Statute, 32 l.L.M. 1192, at art. 2.
14. ICTY Statute, 321.L.M. 1192, at art. 2.
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violations of the laws or customs of war, 15 and crimes against
humanity. 16
Tadic first contested the legitimacy of the creation and the subject
matter jurisdiction of the ICTY. The ICTY refuted his arguments in the
Tadic Jurisdiction Trial Judgment, 17 and again on appeal in the Tadic
Jurisdiction Appeals Judgment. 18 On the merits, the Tadic Trial
Chamber 19 found the defendant guilty on most of the counts. The Tadic
Appeals Chamber partially reversed the legal reasoning of the Trial
Chamber. 20
In the four Judgments in the Tadic case, the ICTY interpreted its
Statute and developed the fundamental principles on which its entire
jurisprudence afterwards was based. One of the fundamental problems
faced by the ICTY was whether the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina was
international because of the military assistance received by the Bosnian
Serb Army from the Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Both the ICJ and the ICTY had to determine the nature and
closeness of the relationship between the military or paramilitary groups
and the intervening State for liability purposes. The traditional view, as
presented by the ICTY, is that the tests of both Tribunals are in conflict.
However, at a closer look, this conflict appears to be exaggerated or
even non-existent.
III. GENERAL TEST TO DETERMINE THE INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER OF
AN ARMED CONFLICT IN TADIC

The traditional view, which perceives the holdings of Nicaragua
and Tadic to be in conflict, is generated by the way the Tadic Appeals
Chamber read the Nicaragua case. 21
The Tadic Appeals Chamber articulated, first, a more general legal
15. ICTY Statute, 32 l.L.M. 1192, at art. 3.
16. Id. at art. 5.
17. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Jurisdiction Trial Judgment (Aug. 10,
1995).
18. Tadic Appeal, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Jurisdiction Appeals Judgment (Oct. 2,
1995).
19. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Judgment (May 7, 1997).
20. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment (July 15, 1999); and the
Corrigendum to Judgment of the Appeals Chamber of July 15, 1999 (19 Nov. 1999).
21. The Tadic Jurisdiction Appeals Chamber did not resolve the issue whether the
armed conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina was international or not, implicitly leaving the
decision and the test to be elaborated to the Chambers who would hear the merits of the
case. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Jurisdiction Appeals Judgment, at para. 77 (Oct. 2,
1995). Contra id. at paras. 17-20 (Separate Opinion of Judge Li on the Defense Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction); see also Byron, supra note 8, at 67.
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test to determine the character of an armed conflict.
It is indisputable that an armed conflict is international
if it takes place between two or more States. In addition, in
cases of an internal armed conflict breaking out on the
territory of a State, it may become international (or,
depending upon the circumstances, be international in
character alongside an internal armed conflict) if
(i) another State intervenes in that conflict through its
troops, or alternatively if
(ii) some of the participants in the internal armed
conflict act on behalf of that other State. 22
The first hypothesis, the intervention of another State, can be
proven factually. Analyzing the second hypothesis, however, is more
complex. 23
IV. INTERPRETATION OF THE HOLDING OF NICARAGUA BY THE TADIC
APPEALS CHAMBER

To determine whether "some of the participants in the internal
armed conflict act on behalf of' another State, the Tadic A~peals
Chamber drew guidance from the Nicaragua Judgment of the ICJ.
The Tadic Appeals Chamber read the Nicaragua Judgment to
mean that the ICJ made a distinction between the acts of three
individuals or groups of individuals.
According to the ICTY, the ICJ first established that acts were
imputable to the United States if the individuals concerned were
officials of the United States (for instance high-altitude reconnaissance
flights by U.S. airplanes). 25
Second, the ICJ discussed whether individuals, not having the
status of United States officials, but allegedly paid by and acting unde.r
22. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, at para. 84 (July 15, 1999) followed
by Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Trial Judgment, at para. 75 (Mar. 3, 2000); Kordic, Case
No. IT-95-14/20-T, Trial Judgment, at para. 66 (Feb. 26, 2001).
23. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Trial Judgment, at para. 76 (Mar. 3, 2000).
24. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, at para. 99 (July 15, 1999).
25. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.CJ. 14 (June 27), 52-53, para. 91 [hereinafter Nicaragua]; see also the dissenting opinions
on the principle of State responsibility and the "effective control test." Id. at 181, 185-190,
paras. 11, 14-19; (separate opinion of Judge Ago). Id. at 259, 388 para. 257 of Part IV; "The
Law," Chapter U "Responsibility for Violations of the Law of War" (dissenting opinion of
Judge Schwebel); Id. at 528, 537-538 (dissenting opinion of Judge Sir Robert Jennings).
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the instructions of United States organs, could legally involve the
responsibility of the United States.
These individuals in the Nicaragua case were nationals of
unidentified Latin American countries, referred to in the vocabulary of
the CIA as UCLA's (Unilaterally Controlled Latino Assets). The
UCLA's carried out specific tasks such as the mining of Nicaraguan
ports or waters in early 1984, and attacks on Nicaraguan port and oil
installations in late 1983 and early 1984.26
According to the ICTY, the ICJ developed, in the Nicaragua case,
the "effective control" test; holding that the acts of the UCLA's are
imputable to the United States in two ways, either on account of the fact
that, in addition to being paid by United States agents or officials, they
had been given specific instructions by these agents or officials and had
acted under their supervision and with their logistic support,27 or
because "agents of the United States had participated in the planning,
direction, support and execution of the operations."28
The ICJ found that the "effective control" test was met for the
UCLA's, and that the attacks by the UCLA's, if proven, were imputable
to the United States.
Finally, the ICJ moved to ascertain whether the responsibility of
the United States could arise when it supported military or paramilitary
groups (the contras) in Nicaragua.
The ICTY interpreted the Nicaragua judgment to mean that the
ICJ applied the same "effective control" test of the UCLA's to the
contras. 29 In the view of the ICTY, the ICJ required that the contras not
only be paid or financed by the United States, and their action be
coordinated or supervised by the United States, but also that the United
States should issue specific instructions concerning the commission of
the acts of the contras in question.
The ICJ found that the "effective control" test was not met as far as
the contras were concerned, because despite the heavy subsidies and
other support provided to them by the United States, there was no clear
evidence of the United States having actually exercised such a degree of

26. Nicaragua, 19861.C.J. at 45-46, para. 75.
27. Id. at 48, para. 80.
28. Id. at 50-51, para. 86.
29. "[P]erpetration of the acts contrary to human rights and humanitarian law .... For
this conduct to give rise to legal responsibility of the United States, it would in principle
have to be proved that that State had effective control of the military or paramilitary
operations in the course of which the alleged violations were committed." Id. at 64-65,
para. 115.
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control in all fields as to justify treating the contras as acting on its
behalf. 30
V. TADIC TRIAL CHAMBER FOLLOWS NICARAGUA
The majority opinion of the Tadic Trial Chamber followed the
"effective control" test of the ICJ. 31
The Trial Chamber implicitly found that the Bosnian Serb forces
were not under the effective control of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia after the Yugoslavian army formally withdrew from BosniaHerzegovina, and that therefore the conflict was non-international. For
that reason, the Trial Chamber found that TadiC' s victims only enjoyed
the lower level of protection contained in Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions, and not the protection of the more specific grave
breaches clause, which is applicable to protected persons in the hands of
a party during an international armed conflict. 32

VI. TADIC APPEALS CHAMBER REVERSES
The majority opinion of the Tadic Appeals Chamber, however,
reversed.
The Appeals Chamber departed from the holding of the ICJ with
regard to military or paramilitary groups, as well as the third group in
the Nicaragua case, and held that the "effective control" test was

30. Nicaragua, 1986 1.C.J. at 62 & 139, paras. 109, 277; see also Tadic, Case No. IT94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, at paras. 112, 114 (July 15, 1999).
31. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Judgment, at paras. 584-88 (1997); see also id.
(McDonald, G., dissenting), at paras. 32-34 (discussing the applicability of article 2 of the
statute, rejecting the "effective control test" and proposing the "dependence and control"
test, hereby sewing the seeds of the "overall control" test: "I question why there should be a
requirement that effective control was in fact exercised when the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia ... was assured that, having transferred officers and enlisted men and provided
the material, thereby depleting its forces, its plan would be executed . . . . The key issue
here is whether the VRS [the Army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina/Republika Srpska] was indeed dependent on and controlled by the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia.").
32. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Judgment, at paras. 507-08 (1997); see also id.
(McDonald, G., dissenting), at paras. 5-15 (suggesting that even if the Nicaragua test would
be the relevant test, the VRS was under the "effective control" of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, which would make the conflict an international one); see also Prosecutor v.
Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Judgment, at paras. 214, 230 (1998) (taking a different
approach in the Celebici case, the Trial Chamber found it unnecessary to discuss the
Nicaragua case, on the basis that the ICJ was a very different body from the ICTY and was
ruling on issues of State responsibility rather than individual criminal responsibility and
further finding that the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina was international); see also Byron,
supra note 8, at 71-72.
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against the very logic of the entire system of international law on State
responsibility. 33 The Chamber further referred to cases involving the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, the European Court of Human
Rights and State courts, findin~ that international State and judicial
practice had applied another test. 4
The Tadic Appeals Chamber held that the extent of requisite State
control varies.
According to the Appeals Chamber, the "effective control" test is
still applicable to the second group in the Nicaragua case-the
UCLA's. To hold a State responsible for an act of a single private
individual that is not a State official, it is necessary to ascertain
"whether specific instructions concerning the commission of that
particular act had been issued by that State ... ; alternatively, it must be
established whether the unlawful act had been publicly endorsed or
approved ex post facto by the State at issue. " 35
But the majority opinion of the Tadic Appeals Chamber rejected
the "effective control" test for "armed forces or militias or paramilitary
units," and developed an "overall control" test. The "overall control"
must comprise "more than the mere provision of financial assistance or
military equipment or training," but "does not go so far as to include the
issuing of specific orders by the State, or its direction of each individual
operation." Therefore, "[t]he control . . . may be deemed to exist when a
State ... has a role in organising, coordinating or planning the military
actions of the military group, in addition to financing, training and
equipping or providing operational support to that group."36
Finally the Tadic Appeals Chamber referred to the Be/sen and
Menten 37 cases, which are two cases of German World War II criminals,
33. Tadic, IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, at paras. 116-23 (1999); see also id., at para.
5 (Shahabuddeen, M., dissenting) (finding the Nicaragua test "both right and adequate").
34. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, at paras. 124-25 (July 15, 1999).
35. Id. at para. 137.
36. Id. (With Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, who reserves the position on
the "overall control test,") followed by Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Trial Judgment, at
para. 75 (Mar. 3, 2000)(with Separate Declaration of Judge Shahabuddeen, who again
argues the soundness of the Nicaragua test); Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appeals
Judgment, at para. 134 (Mar. 24, 2000); Ce/ebiCi, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeals Judgment
(Feb. 9, 2005); Kordic, IT-95-14/2-T, Trial Judgment, at paras. 111-15 (Feb. 26, 2001).
37. The Be/sen Case-Trial of Joseph Kramer and 44 Others, British Military Court,
Luneberg, Sept. 17-Nov. 17, 1945, II Law Reports of Trial of War Criminals, Selected and
Prepared by the United Nations War Crimes Commission 1 (London: Published for the
United Nations War Crimes Commission by His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1947)
[hereinafter Be/sen Case]; Public Prosecutor v. Menten, Hoge Raad (Supreme Court of the
Netherlands), May 29, 1978, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, 1978, 1267; 10 NETHERLANDS
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 514 (1979); 75 INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS 331, 346
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establishing the view that international law embraced even another test,
by which individuals can be assimilated to State organs "on account of
their actual behaviour within the structure of a State (and regardless of
any possible requirement of State instructions). " 38
Applying the "overall control" test to the Bosnian Serb Army, the
majority of the Tadic Appeals Chamber found that Bosnian Serb Forces
were under the "overall control" of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. 39 Hereby, the ICTY triggered the application of the grave
breaches provisions of the Geneva Conventions and its own jurisdiction
under article 2 of the ICTY Statute.

(1987).
38. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, at para. 141 (July 15, 1999). The holding of
the Tadic Appeals Chamber seems to be incorrect with respect to this fourth group of
individuals. The Appeals Chamber drew guidance from the Be/sen and the Menten cases.
However, the two cases on which the Appeals Chamber bases its holding deal with
individual criminal responsibility, and not with State responsibility through acts of
individuals or armed groups. The defendants in the Be/sen case (also referred to as the
Kramer case) comprised not only some German staff members of the Belsen and Auschwitz
concentration camps, but also a number of camp inmates of Polish nationality and an
Austrian Jew "elevated by the camp administrators to positions of authority over the other
internees." Be/sen Case, supra note 37. They were inter alia accused of murder and other
offences against the other camp inmates. The defence argued that no war crime could be
committed by Poles against other Allied nationals. The Prosecutor however replied that "by
identifying themselves with the authorities the Polish accused had made themselves as much
responsible as the S.S. themselves. Perhaps it could be claimed that by the same process
they could be regarded as having approximated to membership of the armed forces of
Germany." Id. In the Menten case, Peter Menten, a Dutch national, was found guilty by the
Dutch courts of having killed, in July 1941 in Poland a number of civilians, mostly Jews, on
behalf of German Special Forces. Public Prosecutor v. Menten, Hoge Raad (Supreme Court
of the Netherlands), May 29, 1978; Neder/andse Jurisprudentie, supra note 37. The courts
applied Article 27 a of the Dutch Decree establishing Extraordinary Penal Provisions (BBS)
and convicted Menten for crimes against humanity as defined in Article 6(b) and (c) of the
Charter of the International Military Court annexed to the London Agreement of August 8,
1945. Id. However, Article 27 a BBS required that the accused, when the offence was
committed, was "in military, state or public service of or with the enemy." Id. Menten was
assigned to the German Special Forces as interpreter, but was formally not a member of
these Special Forces. Id. The Court found that it "was justified in assuming that his position
in the Einsatzkommando and his performances in it were of a more or less official character.
Id. Thus, the relationship to the enemy in which Menten rendered incidental services was of
such a nature that he could be regarded as a functionary of the enemy," and consequently
was individually criminally responsible for the crimes under Art. 27 a of the BBS. Id. Both
the Be/sen and the Menten cases present questions of individuals' criminal responsibility,
and not of State responsibility.
39. "Such control manifested itself not only in financial, logistical and other assistance
and support, but also, and more importantly, in terms of participation in the general
direction, coordination and supervision of the activities and operations of the [Bosnian Serb
Forces]. This sort of control is sufficient for the purposes of the legal criteria required by
international law." Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Jurisdiction Appeals Judgment, at para. 156
(July 15, 1999).
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In the way the ICTY read the holding of the Nicaragua case, the
"overall control" test seems to be in conflict with the "effective control"
test. However, the Tadic Appeals Chamber mentioned that the holding
of the Nicaragua case "might at first sight seem somewhat unclear.''4°
Did the Appeals Chamber misinterpret the Nicaragua case?
VII. "DIRECTION AND CONTROL" TEST, AND THE WEIGHING OF THE
FACTORS

The perceived conflict between the "effective control" test and
"overall control" test is exaggerated or even does not exist. Both tests
are manifestations of a more general test of "direction and control,''4 1 as
elaborated by the International Law Commission (ICL) in its Draft
Articles on State Responsibility.
The Nicaragua and the Tadic judgments distinguished between
three categories and groups.
The first category are individuals who enjoy the status of organs
under the national law of that State (in the Nicaragua case: high-altitude
reconnaissance flights by U.S. pilots), or who at least belong to public
entities empowered within the domestic legal system of the State to
exercise certain elements of governmental authority. Both the ICTY and
the ICJ agree that there can be no doubt that a State incurs responsibility
for their acts. 42
This view is correct and consistent with article 4 of the August
2001 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility. 43
For the second and third categories (in the Nicaragua case, the
UCLA's and the contras), the question is what degree of authority or
control must be wielded by a foreign State over armed individuals or
forces fighting on its behalf in order to define an armed conflict which
is prima facie internal, as one that is international in character.
40. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment at para. 114 (July 15, 1999).
41. See also, Nicaragua, 1986 I.CJ. at 62, para. 109 ("What the [ICJ] has to
determine . . . is whether or not the relationship of the contras to the United States
Government was so much one of dependence on the one hand and control on the other that
it would be right to equate the contras, for legal purposes, with an organ of the United States
Government ... " (emphasis added)).
42. Id.; Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, at para. 109 (Jul. 15 1999).
43. Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., Supp. No.
10, at 44, U.N. Doc a/56/10 (2001). Article 4: Conduct of organs of a State "l. The conduct
of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law, whether
the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position
it holds in the organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the central
government or of a territorial unit of the State. 2. An organ includes any person or entity
which has that status in accordance with the internal law of the State." Id.
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Article 8 of the August 2001 ILC Draft Articles on State
Responsibility requires that "the person or group of persons ... is in
fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of,
that State" (emphasis added). 44 The ILC, however, provides no guidance
for what degree of control (e.g., effective or overall) is required.
The principles of international law concerning the attribution to
States of acts performed by private individuals or groups are not based
on rigid and uniform criteria, as already mentioned by the Tadic
Appeals Chamber. 45
On a closer reading, it appears that the ICJ was not setting out an
"effective control" test, but was weighing a number of factors to
determine the degree of control required to trigger State responsibility.
The following factors can be crystallized from the Nicaragua and
Tadic judgments.
VIII. FACTORS
A. Direct Interference
The first and most decisive factor is the direct interference of the
regular armed forces of a State in another State to support individuals or
military or paramilitary groups.
In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ found that there was no direct
interference to support the UCLA's or the contras because "all United
States trainers or advisors remain[ed] on the other side of the frontier, or
in international waters. ''46
The ICTY on the other hand found direct interference by active
elements of the Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which
continued to be involved in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina.47
B. Financial Assistance
A second very important factor is the financing of individuals or
military or paramilitary groups by the intervening State.
In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ found that the UCLA's were
44. Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., Supp. No.
10, U.N. Doc a/56/10. (Article 8: Conduct directed or controlled by a State: "The conduct of
a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if
the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction
or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct.").
45. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, at para. 117 (1999).
46. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 60, para. 80.
47. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, at para. 151 (1999).
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"persons in the pay" of the United States. 48 Concerning the contras, the
ICJ found that
[i]nitial activities in 1981 seem to have been financed out of
the funds available to the CIA for 'covert' actions; ... $19.5
million was allocated to these activities. Subsequently, ... a
further $19 million was approved in late 1981 .... The
budgetary arrangements for funding subsequent operations
up to the end of 1983 have not been made clear, though a
press report refers to the United States Congress as having
approved 'about $20 million' for the fiscal year to 30
September 1983 .... During the fiscal year 1984 ... $24
million ... was available to the Central Intelligence
Agency. 49
The ICJ further found that
[f]inance for supporting the military and paramilitary
activities of the contras was thus available from the budget
of the United States Government from some time in 1981
until 30 September 1984; and finance limited to
'humanitarian assistance' has been available since that date
from the same source and remains authorized until 30
September 1986. 50
The ICTY held that the "financing, trammg and equipping or
providing operational support" of a military or paramilitary group was a
relevant factor to determine State responsibility and/or the international
character of an armed conflict. 51 The Tadic Appeals Chamber found that
there was a "continuing payment of salaries, to Bosnian Serb and nonBosnian Serb officers [of the Bosnian Serb Army] alike, by the
Government of the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia."52 The pay of
all 1st Krajina Corps officers and presumably of all senior
Commanders [of the Bosnian Serb Army], as former officers

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 48, para. 80.
Id. at 55, para. 95.
See also id. at 58, paras. 97, 99, 100.
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, at para. 137.
Id. at para. 150.
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of the [Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia],
continued to be received from Belgrade ... acknowledging
that a possible conclusion with regard to individuals, is that
payment could well 'be equated with control. ' 53
C. Military Assistance

A third factor is the military assistance provided by a State to
individuals or military or paramilitary groups.
In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ found that the contras received
arms, ammunition, food, and equipment, including uniforms, boots and
radio equipment from the CIA. Further, the CIA "supplied the [contras]
with intelligence, particularly as to Nicaraguan troop movements,
derived from radio and telephonic interception, code-breaking, and
surveillance by aircraft and satellites."54
The Tadic Appeals Chamber found that the forces of the Bosnian
Serb Army were "almost completely dependent on the supplies of the
[Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] to carry out offensive
operations. " 55
D. Supervision

A fourth factor is the degree of supervision by a State over persons
or military or paramilitary groups.
The ICJ found, in the Nicaragua case, this factor decisive when it
required proof that the State issued specific instructions concerning the
commission of the unlawful acts in question. The ICJ was satisfied that
these specific instructions existed for the UCLA's. There was sufficient
evidence that the UCLA's were "persons ... acting on the
instructions . . . under the supervision and with the logical support of
United States agents."56 Thus, the UCLA's had attacked according to an
established pattern.
A 'mother ship' was supplied ... by the CIA; ... Speedboats,
guns and ammunition were supplied by the United States
administration, and the actual attacks were carried out by
UCLA's .... agents of the United States participated in the
planning, direction, support and execution of the operations.

53.
54.
55.
56.

Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, at para. 154 (1999).
Nicaragua, 19861.C.J. at 59, para. 101.
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, at para. 155 (1999).
Nicaragua, 19861.C.J. at 48, para. 80.
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The execution was the task rather of the UCLA's, while
United States nationals participated in the planning, direction
and support. 57
The ICJ required the same threshold of "effective control" for the
contras as it did for the UCLA's. Although there was "considerable
material in press reports of statements by [contra] officials indicating
participation of CIA advisers in planning and the discussion of strategy
or tactics, " 58 there was no proof that specific instruction had been issued
by the United States concerning the acts of the contras. Therefore, the
ICJ found that the United States was not responsible under international
law for the acts of the contras.
The Tadic Appeals Chamber also held supervision to be a relevant
factor. The Appeals Chamber made a distinction between individuals
not organized into military structures, where "specific instructions or
directives aimed at the commission of specific acts" had to be given,
and military or paramilitary groups, where no specific instructions were
required, but only general coordination or "helping in the general
planning of its military activity." 59 The Appeals Chamber found that
"the [Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] controlled the
political and military objectives, as well as the military operation, of the
[Bosnian Serb army]. " 60 Officers who were not of Bosnian Serb
extraction were transferred from their postings in the army of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to equivalent postings in the Bosnian
Serb Army. "[T]he [Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]
directed and supervised the activities and operations of [the Bosnian
Serb Army]. As a result, the [the Bosnian Serb Army] reflected the
strategies and tactics devised by the [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
and its army]."61 Further,
[i]t was apparent that ... the Bosnian Serb army continued to
act in pursuance of the military goals formulated in Belgrade.
In this regard, clear evidence of a chain of military command
between Belgrade and [the headquarters of the Bosnian
Serbs] was presented to the Trial Chamber and the Trial
Chamber accepted that the [Bosnian Serb Army's] Main
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Nicaragua, 19861.C.J. at 50-51, paras. 86.
Id. at 60, para. 104.
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, at para. 155 (1999)
Id. at para. 150.
Id. at para. 151.
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Staff had links and regular communications with Belgrade. 62

E. Nationality
A last factor, although not expressed in the judgments of the ICJ
and the ICTY, could be the relationship between the intervening State
and the nationality of the individuals or military or paramilitary groups.
An international tribunal is, however, not automatically bound by
the nationality granted by a State on the basis of its domestic laws. 63
The nationality of persons or members of armed groups should not be
determined on the basis of formal national characterizations, but rather
upon an analysis of their substantial relations, taking into consideration
the different ethnicity of the persons or members of armed groups, and
their bonds with the foreign intervening State. 64 For example, Bosnian
Serbs who support the Greater Serbia cause are not Bosnians, they are
Serbs.
A common nationality between the individuals or the members of
the armed group and the intervening State can lead to a shared military
objective. The Tadic Appeals Chamber found that a "distinguishable
feature of the [Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] and the
[Bosnian Serb Army] was that they possessed shared military
objectives. As a result, it is inherently unlikely that orders from
Belgrade circumventing or overriding the authority of local Corps
commanders [of the Bosnian Serb Army] would have ever been

62. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, at para. 152.
63. See Advisory Opinion No. 4, Nationality Decrees issued in Tunis and Morocco,
1923 P.C.l.J. 1 (ser. B) No. 4: "it may well happen that, in a matter which, like that of
nationality, is not, in principle, regulated by international law, the right of a State to use its
discretion is nevertheless restricted by obligations which it may have undertaken towards
other States. In such a case, jurisdiction which, in principle, belongs solely to the State, is
limited by rules of international law." Id at 24; see also Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v.
Guatemala), 1955 l.C.J. 4 (making a distinction between on the one hand the right of every
sovereign State, to settle by its own legislation the rules relating to the acquisition of its
nationality, and on the other hand the international community which determines whether a
State is entitled to exercise protection and to seize the ICJ). "International practice provides
many examples of acts performed by States in the exercise of their domestic jurisdiction
which do not necessarily or automatically have international effect, which are not
necessarily or automatically binding on other States or which are binding on them only
subject to certain conditions." Id at 21. "Guatemala is under no obligation to recognize a
nationality granted in such circumstances." Id at 26; see also Barcelona Traction, Light and
Power Co., Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain) 1970 l.C.J. 83-84, at paras. 33-34 (separate opinion of
Judge Fitzmaurice).
64. Principle stated for the determination of the nationality of the victims under the
Geneva Conventions. CelebiCi, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeals Judgment, at paras. 81, 84
(Feb. 20, 2001); see also Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Trial Judgment, at para. 153 (Feb.
26, 2001).
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necessary as these forces were of the same mind'' (emphasis added). 65
IX. TASK OF EVERY COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

This-non exhaustive-list of factors will have to be weighed to
determine the responsibility of an intervening State for the acts of
individuals or military or paramilitary groups.
Undue emphasis upon one factor, as opposed to a balanced
analysis of the reality of the relationship between that State and
individuals or military or paramilitary groups, could lead to evasion of
responsibility. For instance, stressing the ostensible structures and overt
declarations of a State may tacitly suggest to persons or groups who are
in de facto control of the State, that responsibility could be evaded
merely by resort to a superficial restructuring of the groups or by a
facile declaration that the reconstituted groups are henceforth
independent of their erstwhile sponsors. 66
Every court of first instance, as a finder of the facts on the record,
will have to determine which factors it deems to be relevant, and which
degree of direct interference, financial or military assistance,
supervision, and nationality it requires to trigger the responsibility of the
intervening State, and therefore to change the character of the conflict
into an international one. 67
Therefore, there is no contradiction between Nicaragua and Tadic.
The ICJ, as a court of first instance and a finder of facts on the record,
could perfectly require a higher level of supervision (or "effective
control"), after it had established that the contras were an independent
organization. The contras were found to exist before the United States
started providing financial assistance, and to have continued their
operations after the United States had cut off their funds. 68
The critical language of Nicaragua reads:
All the forms of United States participation mentioned
above, and even the general control by the [United States]
65. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, at para 153 (July 15, 1999).
66. Id. at para. 154.
67. See also contra Commentary on the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
International Wrongful Acts, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its
Fifty-Third Session, supra note 1, at 59, 107, art. 8, comm. 5. ("In any event it is a matter for
appreciation in each case whether particular conduct was or was not carried out under the
control of a State, to such an extent that the conduct controlled should be attributed to it.").
68. Nicaragua, 19861.C.J. at 21, 53-54, 61, paras. 18, 93-94, 108 ("Even on the face of
the evidence offered by the Applicant, ... the Court is unable to find that the United States
created an armed opposition in Nicaragua."). Id. at para. 94.
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over a force with a high degree of dependence on it, would
not in themselves mean, without further evidence, that the
United States directed or enforced the perpetration of the
acts .... For this conduct [of a force with a high degree of
dependence on it] to give rise to legal responsibility of the
United States, it would in principle have to be proved that
that State had effective control of the military or paramilitary
operations in the course of which the alleged violations were
committed (emphasis added). 69
However, nothing in the Nicaragua case suggests that the same
threshold of "effective control" has to be applied if the factors of the
case are different, like in Tadic, where the Bosnian Serb Army was just
a copy of the Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and where
all the factors point towards the responsibility of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia.
CONCLUSION

A. The Bosnian Genocide Case
The ICJ will have a second chance to weigh the factors and to
decide whether a State is responsible under international law for the acts
of military or paramilitary groups. 70
The State of Bosnia-Herzegovina brought a case against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under the Genocide Convention, 71 and
claims that a number of acts constituting genocide have been committed
by former members of the Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
and by Serb military and paramilitary forces under the direction of, at
the behest of, and with assistance from the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. More specifically, the case alleges:

military and paramilitary activities, including the bombing

69. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 64-65, para. 115.
70. In the view of the I.C.J., the Genocide Convention is applicable, without reference
to the circumstances linked to the domestic or international nature of the conflict. Case
Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), 1996 I.C.J. 595, 615, at para. 31(July11,
1996).
71. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G .A. Res.
260 A (III), Dec. 9, 1948.
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and shelling of towns and villages, the destruction of houses
and forced migration of civilians, and of acts of violence,
including execution, murder, torture, and rape which, in the
circumstances in which they have occurred, show . . . that
acts of genocide have been committed ... against the Muslim
inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 72
Bosnia-Herzegovina claims that the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia is fully responsible under international law for these acts of
the Bosnian Serbs.
It would be logical that the ICJ would apply the five non
exhaustive factors in the same way as the ICTY. The ICJ could then
find ( 1) that there has been direct interference by the Army of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina;
(2) that the Bosnian Serb Army is financed, trained, and equipped by
Belgrade; (3) that the Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
provided military assistance to the Bosnian Serbs; (4) that the Bosnian
Serb Army is under the supervision of Belgrade, and that a more general
threshold of "overall control" can be applied in the Genocide case; and
(5) that the Bosnian Serbs and Mr. Milosivic were of the same
nationality and of "the same mind."
Hence, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is to be found
responsible under international law for the genocide of the Bosnian
Muslims by the Bosnian Serbs.

72. Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), 1993 I.C.J. 3, 21, at para. 40
(Apr. 8, 1993) (Provisional Measures).
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